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part distinguishes the various classes of patients who would be considered by some as 
candidates for euthanasia, and details the kind of treatment appropriate for each. This 
chapter also spells out the requirements for good team care of the very debilitated and dying 
and shows how euthanasia can only compromise proper team care. The final chapter 
considers the specific measures needed to care for the patients in the threatened categories 
of people discussed in the first part of the Report. 
The Report ends with a succinct conclusion, a useful glossary of terms and a competent 
index. A brief but useful note on the Arthur case, an influential infanticide case decided in 
the mid-1980s, is added. 
The Report notes that the Linacre Centre is undertaking a new study on brain death. 
That is a welcome announcement. One hopes that the Centre will also take up a 
development in the euthanasia controversy which it does not address: namely, the growing 
practice of and concern about withholding artificially provided food and water from the 
comatose. Had that issue emerged clearly at the time the Report was written, its judgment 
that handicapped newborns were the group most at risk for the "benefits" of euthanasia 
might have been different. For now it appears that the permanently unconscious are at least 
equally at risk. Such is the dynamism of the movement towards euthanasia. Even so, this 
book is by no means outdated. Its arguments and analyses are not likely to become 
obsolete. For they state as well as I have seen stated, the core of the sanctity of life vision. 
Joseph Boyle 
SI. Michael's College 
University of Toronto 
For the Patient's Good: 
The Restoration of Beneficence in Health Care 
Edmund D. Pellegrino and David C. Thomasma 
o.~ford Unil'ersity Press. o.~ford and Nell' York. 1988.256 pp. Hardcol 'er. $29.95 
In this book, Pellegrino and Thomasma continue their project of constructing a medical 
ethics based on a retrieval of beneficence, a project they began in their earlier work, A 
Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice (1981). In the present volume, the authors leave the 
plane of a general philosophy of medicine, in order to elaborate an ethics of medical 
practice that will support ethically and medically sound clinical decisions, under 
contemporary circumstances. Their model , which they name beneficence-in-trust, is a 
conscious alternative to the quasi-hieratic paternalism of an earlier Hippocratic era: the 
contractarian patient-autonomy model which today enjoys widespread hegemony, and the 
teleology of social utility which now appears aggressively ascendant. 
The case this book makes for the option of grounding applied medical ethics in the good 
is persuasive, for many reasons. It provides a basis for continuity with the best in the 
Hippocratic tradition. It tends to supply a foundation for concrete ethical norms which 
comport with time-tested intuitions of what is right and wrong. As well, it dialectically 
elevates and integrates insights of the competing patient autonomy model, which are of 
undeniable value, and it is articulated within a meta-ethical framework making feasible its 
application under conditions of moral pluralism, by allowing for the interaction of 
differing conceptions of the good on those levels which can be distinguished from the 
minimum agreement necessary to ground the covenant between doctor and patient. Not 
least of aiL it offers a unified protocol for ethical decision-making under clinical conditions 
which appears fully informed by the responsible physician's regard for the sanctity of life, 
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respect for the person, and societal diversity in matters of morality. 
In a critical vein, admittedly, some may question whether the concept of the "relational 
good," which the authors choose as the starting point of their applied ethics, is sufficiently 
basic to enable their ethics to survive as more than an interim modus operandi amid the 
clashes of contemporary pluralism, since this concept arguably presupposes implicit 
attitudes and convictions, which such pluralism, once given quarter, may ultimately 
undermine. Some may ask whether the authors do not give too extensive a role to 
"substituted jUdgment" as a principle for solving treatment dilemmas, without adequate 
constraints against their becoming a subterfuge, at least in the wrong hands, for killing. 
Some may note, too , that elements of paternalism, as opposed to beneficence, may still 
color the authors' understanding of the good patient, and some may even grant that the 
authors' attempt to give concrete expression to their ethics of beneficence-in-trust through 
a new substitute for the Hippocratic oath does not quite succeed . But, to stress such 
putative weaknesses would be unjust. On balance, this volume accomplishes much, under 
very difficult prevailing conditions, and it deserves praise as a welcome addition to the 
literature on medical ethics. 
Pellegrino's and Thomasma's new work is essential reading for any phys ician or ethicist 
engaged in clinical decis ion-making in medicine. This book not only stakes out an 
important theoretical option in medical ethics clearly, but also it does so with profound 
practical moral knowledge of the clinical situation and with an enviable synthetic grasp of 
the contemporary literature of medical ethics. The following review seeks to introduce 
readers to the contours of Pellegrino's and Thomasma's argument and to acquaint them 
more closely with the nature of the contribution which this work represents. Where 
appropriate, the review will note and explain its occasional caveat. 
The Meaning of Beneficence as a Foundation for Medical Ethics 
If ethical approaches can generally be divided into those emphasizing rights and those 
emphasizing the good, and if the now dominant contractarian model of patient autonomy 
belongs among those emphasizing rights , then Pellegrino's and Thomasma's model 
belongs, along with the traditional ethos of medicine, among those emphasizing the good. 
In fashioning their approach, the authors begin from and require assent , however, only to 
that conception of the good implicit in the physician-patient transact ion : the good of 
healing. They prescind from any unitary account of the good, a choice which may broaden 
their model's present appeal, but regrettably may lead to its long run disintegration, for the 
reason voiced above. Proceeding inductively, the authors conclude that the fact of the 
patient's illness orients him to the good which he lacks, that is, the good of bodily health. 
and the act of the physician's profession as physician dedicates her to this same good. 
According to the authors, the medical transaction, by its nature, aims primarily at the 
enhanced biological functioning of the bodily organism. But, they recognize that the goal of 
health, even so defined, has more particular contextual, existential. and conceptual 
determinates. Conceptually, the patient's bodily health can be understood only as a 
dimension of the whole person, the good at stake being the health of the patient's body as he 
experiences it - as an aspect of himself. The authors call this concept "the lived body." 
Since bodily health is an aspect of the good for the person who is a free and unique moral 
agent, the patient will, in any given existential situation, have his own unique weight, 
moreover, to give the relative benefits and burdens presented by treatment options. and 
only he will be able to say what best advances the good of his health all things considered 
- whether he wishes, for instance, to accept a hypertensive medication which may have the 
side-effect of causing impotence. Finally, the context of the patient's overall prognosis 
influences the weighing of particular benefits and burdens in deciding how to treat 
particular systemic problems. 
In this approach, the doctor's underlying goal or continuing baseline of concern is to 
maintain and apply his competency in furthering the biological functioning of the patient's 
body, and to advocate to the patient that he accept treatment fostering such functioning, 
within the limits of what the patient considers to advance his health, in a more wholistic 
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wholistic sense. Some circumstances may justify the doctor in withholding treatment at the 
patient's request, which might marginally advance the biological good of the patient's body. 
But. the authors argue that he is never morally justified in cooperating with an intention. 
even through an act of omission. to end the patient's biological life. This and other norms of 
medical ethics are grounded in the good of the patient's biological health. They bind the 
physician morally. by virtue of both the physician'S act of profession and the physician-
patient covenant. As will be seen. in some cases. they may also bind the physician because 
health is a precondition to the patient's exercise of moral autonomy. 
In this framework . the good at stake. for both doctor and patient. is always "relational". 
Since the physician is obligated to pursue the patient's health in the particular sense 
specified by the conceptual. contextual. and existential determinates which were 
mentioned. acting in the patient's good means not only pursuing the patient's biological 
welfare. but doing so. at all times. according to the patient's informed existential 
assessment of the utility of available treatment options. According to the authors. a critical 
role for the physician is developing and maintaining communication with the patient which 
can effectively integrate the patient's existential evaluations into the decision-making 
process. 
The authors suggest that such communication will be engendered. where the physician 
grants primacy to the existential circumstances of the particular patient; commits himself to 
negotiation with the patient which is truly open-ended in aiming at a present rather than a 
priori ranking of implicated values; seeks to arrive at decisions through consensus with the 
patient; and finally , strives. with the patient. to preserve as many competing values as the 
situation permits. The authors further specify that successful physician-patient negotiation 
presupposes the independent moral autonomy and conscience of both doctor and patient; 
the physician's fiduciary obligation devolving from his greater knowledge and power; the 
physician's cultivation of a virtuous character (the authors stress that theirs is essentially a 
virtue and not a duty-ethic); as well as the physician's commitment to reaching the morally 
right and good decision. within the limits of the situation's inherent ambiguity. 
Because of societal breakdown in shared values, the authors stipulate that the physician 
and patient are to structure their negotiations within a meta-ethical framework , recognizing 
that each may have a differing conception of the good. The framework proposed by the 
authors requires that the parties to the medical transaction recognize. as analytically distinct, 
each of the following understandings of the good : the biological functioning that forms the 
primary baseline of the doctor and patient's shared concern; the patient's unique existential 
assessment of what health requires, given all of the patient's values here and now; the 
patient's integrity as a moral agent capable of reasoned moral choice about such an 
assessment; and, ultimately. the patient's conception of his "ultimate concern" or his "good 
of last resort," according to which he values everything else in his life. As the physician and 
patient negotiate toward a consensus on appropriate treatment. they necessarily will share a 
regard for the good of biological health and the good of the patient's reasoned moral choice, 
since these are values implied in the physician-patient covenant. but they may differ in their 
existential assessment of the good at stake and in their respective interpretations of the "good 
of last resort". The authors recognize that the latter kind of disagreement may be the most 
intractable. In the case of a conflict. the competent decision of the patient prevails. but the 
authors contend that the doctor, as a free moral agent, ought to withdraw from the case ifthe 
treatment decision offends his sense of morality. For example, the writers argue that the 
religious objector's right to refuse a life-saving transfusion should be respected. but so. too. 
should the doctor's right to withdraw where his conscience requires it. 
In this scheme, the physician obviously must devote considerable energy not just to the 
pursuit of the patient's biological health, but also to promoting the good of his reasoned 
moral choice. He must provide the patient with a continuing account of the probabilities and 
uncertaintities relevant to treatment decisions. He must ensure that such information is not 
overmathematicized, and he must otherwise convey it in a manner favoring meaningful 
assimilation by the patient. Moreover, the physician must keep in view the intrinsic assault 
which illness represents on the patient's autonomy, psychologically, socially and perhaps, 
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cognitively. The doctor has a fiduciary duty to the patient to help him retain true moral 
autonomy in the face of the assaultive character of disease. 
Am.ong his strictly medical goals, the authors suggest that the physician must, in addition 
to pursuing the patient's total bodily health, seek to preserve the medical conditions 
necessary for the patient rationally to make moral decisions about the course of treatment. 
This ancillary goal makes it essential that the doctor informally monitor the patient's 
competency, and treat causes of incompetence which are relevant to ongoing treatment 
decisions, even though, at times, this means overriding the patient's express directives. In the 
view of the authors, the physician may be so justified, where necessary, to stabilize a crisis 
until probabilities become clear, reverse a defect in mental competence, or correct 
psychiatric interference in social relations. 
While it is clear that Pellegrino and Thomasma have integrated the value of patient 
autonomy into their approach, in counterdistinction to their "contractarian" rivals, they 
obviously understand the value of autonomy to be derivative of and subordinate to that of 
beneficience. They reject the contractarian notion of ethicists like Engelhardt which simply 
places the physician's competency at the service of the patient's values, whatever these may 
be. According to the authors, such approaches have entered and dominated much of medical 
ethics only during, perhaps, the past 20 years, although they have obviously been current in 
the political culture since Enlightenment times. Conceptually, such approaches make the 
value of autonomy an absolute prelogical presupposition, and they do so in a way that is 
neither pluralistic nor philosophically justified. Practically, they lead to the "abandonment" 
ofthe patient to a spurious autonomy, since the fact of illness pervasively erodes the patient's 
meaningful exercise of autonomy. Pellegrino and Thomasma correctly argue that serious 
damage will ensue to the moral standards of medical practice and to democracy itself, if the 
contractarian patient autonomy model succeeds in displacing the value of beneficence, 
which has been bequeathed to medicine as its ethical foundation, by the hippocratic tradition. 
The author's presentation of their model shows that they have thought deeply about the 
physician's role. Such may not be as true with regard to the role of patient. The virtues they 
espouse for patients include candor, compliance, nonlitigiousness, noninterference in the 
medical transactions of other patients, and gratitude to their own physicians. While these 
enumerated characteristics are positive enough in their place, the list is strangely passive. One 
would have expected to see the authors develop a statement of the intellectual and moral 
virtues relevant to sustaining psychic and social wholeness in the face of illness, and to making 
moral decisions about the treatment of illness, or to describe the steps which might promote 
the will and self-knowledge which are preconditions to healing: Since the authors do none of 
these things, some readers will conclude that they have not yet succeeded in disentangling 
beneficence from paternalism. . . 
If one underlying concrete problem absorbs Pellegrino and Thomasma, it is the tendency of 
burgeoning technological innovations to overwhelm moral control of medical decisions. The 
problem is particularly acute, as the patient approaches death. _The existential value of 
incremental benefits to the patient's short term biological functioning becomes increasingly 
difficult to measure, as inevitable death comes nearer. In this context, the authors are rightly 
concerned about the danger of "therapeutic belligerence," i.e., modes of treatment which 
subject the patient to treatments with marginal or no benefit to his biological state, but which 
are of serious cost to his human dignity. They argue that, under circumstances restricted to 
imminent and inevitable death, it makes sense to permit medical judgments that the "quality 
of life" of the patient no longer warrants attempting to extend his biological life. However, 
they are adamant that by "quality oflife", they mean the patient's existential experience oflife 
and not the value of the patient's life in the estimation of others. 
The authors focus , also, on the irrevocably comatose patient, whose life has been artificial, 
extended by modern technology beyond the cessation of consciousness. They hold firmly 
that, in such cases, the physician has a prima facie duty-indefinitely" to continue extending 
artificial fupport to the pa!ient's life, even though the patient's bodily good, at that point, 
cannot meaningfully be conceived as more than basic "comfort". The withdrawal of treatment 
which will bring bodily death in its wake, is prima facie permitted, they say,. only where the 
treatment brings with it a degree of bodily burden which can be said to contradict the claim 
that providing it equals giving physical comfort. 
Since the authors classify medically delivered nutrition and hydration as a form of 
treatment, this' amounts to a position in the current debate on that topic. In order to 
understand fully their position in the matter, one must note the critical exception which they 
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make to the prima .facie rule just stated. This exception is grounded in the principle of 
"substituted judgment," and it runs as follows: since a conscious patient always has the right to 
refuse a particular treatment based on his existential assessment of the burden which it 
represents , the doctor is said also ordinarily to be bound by proxies which tell him what the 
patient would have decided, in present circumstances, were he not unconscious. Such a proxy 
may be a written directive. such as a "living will," or it may be a surrogate decision maker, such 
as a family member who claims to know that patient's relevant convictions. Equipped with a 
proxy request to withhold artificial forms of life support, such as artificial nutrition and 
hydration , the physician may thus withhold them, even where, in the prima(acie case, they 
would be mandatory, as conducive to the patient's bodily comfort. 
The authors are careful to draw several lines aimed at preventing this "substituted 
jUdgment" exception from eroding respect for the sanctity of life. First, they deny the 
applicability of the substituted judgment exception to the class of never competent patients, 
since these patients have never had the opportunity to come to an existential balancing of 
values which could qualify the judgment in the prima.facie case. The authors rightly see this 
restriction as important because, as a group, never-competent patients are particularly 
vulnerable to utilitarian exclusion from societal benefits. Second, they require the physician to 
be an advocate for the unconscious patient who rejects the force of proxies which are not 
demonstrably valid, applicable, free of conflict of interest. Third, they emphasize that the 
substituted judgment of the surrogate decisionmaker must go exclusively to what existential 
burdens this patient would have felt from this treatment option. The surrogate decisionmaker 
may not substitute his own values or those of the "reasonable man". 
For all of the strengths of the authors' attempt to deal with the difficult nutrition-hydration 
debate. their attempt seems to suffer from serious weaknesses. Most critically. it does not 
clearly specify the criteria for determining when the refusal of treatment by a competent 
patient is suicidal in nature. They would seem to agree that formal cooperation with a 
conscious "suicidal" refusal (as in the Boul'ia case) would be wrong and should be against the 
prqfessional ethics of medicine. By the same token. implementing such a refusal for a 
postcompetent patient under a "living will", would be equally wrong and should equally be 
deemed a violation of professional ethics. 
When is the refusal of treatment a form of suicide? Some have attempted to make this 
delineation by requiring that nutrition and hydration always be deemed basic care rather than 
treatment. with the consequence that rejecting them will be suicidal where death is 
proximately caused by their removal. The authors reject this criterion. In their own prima 
facie case, in which the patient is assumed to express no wish one way or the other, they make 
the imminence and inevitability of death from other causes a criterion for the licit ness of 
withholding marginal medical benefits, but they pointedly refrain from applying this criterion 
in setting objective moral limits to when the physician may implement a "substituted 
judgment" to remove nutrition and hydration. The authors also fail to pursue a possible 
argument that where objective proof does not exist of a present and disproportionate physical 
or psychological burden, beyond the fact per se of the artificial nutrition and hydration, the 
act of withdrawing the treatment should be viewed as suicidal in nature. Neither do they 
explore the possibility that at least where any higher consciousness remains, however senile or 
imbecilic, the minimal burdens of medically assisted nutrition and hydration should be viewed 
as presumptively non burdensome, so that withdrawal would ordinarily be suicidal. One could 
be more confident in the authors' extensive reliance on the "substituted judgment" exception if 
they developed an aspect of these or some other criteria for the sake of delineating the specific 
difference separating suicide from refusing treatment , to ensure that implementing a 
substituted judgment is never formal cooperation by the physician, in what amounts to 
delayed suicide or murder. 
The authors, moreover. do not appear to be sufficiently sensitive to the fact that the notion 
of "substituted jUdgment" is, in itself. nothing more than a legal fiction. Strictly speaking, it is 
impossible to enact the judgment of another. The most that is possible. in reality. is for a 
judgment to be deemed representative and to be based on what the other is deemed to have 
wanted. In fact. the judgment always remains that of the surrogate. and is never actually that 
of the unconscious patient. The surrogate decision maker will always necessarily interpret the 
supposed ,wishes of a Karen Ann Quinlan against a backdrop of his / her own beliefs about 
reasonableness. He / she cannot help being influenced by a concern with "gatekeeping" over 
family. institutional. or societal resources. Furthermore. the patient's written attestation of his 
"negotiated values", in the form of a living will . is likely, after only minimal institutional 
experience, to become a standard form expressing what amounts to the "reasonable man" 
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standard that the authors mean to repudiate. For all of these reasons. there is a distinct 
danger that the "substituted jUdgment" exception proposed hy Pellegrino and Thomasma 
may actually sen'e as a suhtcrfuge which permits the ciimination of patients for economic 
reasons. without rCljuiring society to face \I'hat is occurring. Such is ironic. since the authors 
generall, pose convincing arguments aga inst the social utility mode l of medical ethics which 
they term "Physician as Gatekeeper" . 
The real and suhstantial contrihution of this \ 'olume lies in its attcmpt to coordinate a 
general framework for clinical dccisionmaking which halances respect for the good with 
respect for patient autonomy. within an essentially hippocratic framework giving priority to 
the good . Especially impressive is the authors' articulation ofa protocol for negotiated decision-
making between physician and patient under difficult clinical conditions. One hopes that the 
authors return to the attempt to provide a new Hippocratic oat h for the medical act of 
profession. which adeljuately embodies their synthesis. The articulation in the present 
volume reljuires revision to clarify that. according to the authors' own understanding of 
medicine. the patient has no categorical power to release the physician from duties which are 
to be considered nonfeasible. 
96 
William Joseph Wagner 
Assistant Professor of Law 
The Catholic University of America 
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